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26/(//(SUMMARY	-
	FAR EAST	
Official states	nents give distorted picture of Burmese situation (page 4)	25X1
(page 5).	ndorses Communist program for the 'liberation' of Tibet	
	SOUTH ASIA	
Indo-Pakistan	i relations reportedly have improved (page 5).	
	WESTERN EUROPE	
Opportunity se strikes (page 8	en for non-Communist labor alliance as Communists plan	
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4-	3. Official statements give distorted	l picture of Burmese situation:
25X1A	confe	ne Minister Thakin Nu of Burma told a press erence in New Delhi, after his two day meeting
	prov	Nehru, that conditions in his country were iming daily. He stated that there were only to 4,000 insurgents scattered about the
	country ''ver	ry and that their rebellion was no longer y serious. "The Burmese also said that the gents had not received aid from China, which,
	he claimed, had maintained a "ve	ry correct attitude" towards Burma.
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	ate distortion of the facts. It is r insurgents in Burma and Commar	nent: These statements represent a deliber- low estimated that there are about 18, 500 ider in Chief Ne Win recently admitted that The remarks of the Prime Minister may be
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only an effort to maintain the fiction of Burma's "neutral" foreign policy or to hide the Burmese Government's weakness. The extreme air of casualness, however, which has been assumed by both the Burmese and Indians gives rise to the suspicion that the conference between the two Premiers was of greater significance than described and that important substantive decisions may have been taken regarding Burma's foreign relations, particularly insofar as they relate to Communist China.

T.	4.	Dalai Lama endorses Communist program for the "liberation" of Tibet:			
25X1A		Dalai Lama had advised Ma and populace of Tibet are g	Peiping radio has broadcast an exchange of telegrams between Mao Tse-tung in Peiping and the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. Mao thanked the Dalai Lama for his "efforts in implementing the agreement for the peaceful liberation of Tibet." The ao on 24 October that the local government, monks giving the May 1951 agreement "unanimous support.		
		Comment: A delegation from Lhasa concluded an agreement with the Peiping regime in May 1951 providing for Tibetan cooperation in the extension of Chinese Communist authority over Tibet. It was widely believed that the Dalai Lama, in refuge on the Indian border, would repudiate this agreement, which deprived him of all significant power in Tibet. However, by September the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa, under occupation by Chinese Communist advance forces, and has since been expected to endorse the agreement. The Dalai Lama's adherence will facilitate			
		the consolidation of Communist control of Tibet.			
			SOUTH ASIA		
	5. Indo-Pakistani relations reportedly have improved:				
25X1A			According to the US Embassy in New Delhi, the depth and sincerity of India's reaction to the Pakistani Prime Minister's assassination, and		
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the conciliatory statement on Indo-Pakistani relations made by Liaquat Ali's successor have lessened tension between the two countries. A member of the British High Commissioner's office has also expressed the view that Indo-Pakistani relations are now better than at any time in the last four years.

Comment: Previous experience with IndoPakistani crises suggests that Indian reaction to Liaquat Ali's assassination,
however sincere, is likely to be brief. Pakistan's almost immediate return
to a state of apparent normalcy has demonstrated the ability of the government
to control the country; and identification of the assassin as an Afghan
national has minimized the possibility of armed anti-Indian outbreaks in
Kashmir. Accordingly, the Indians may feel little need to modify their previous policies with regard to Pakistan, and they may be as uncompromising
as ever when the UN Security Council meets to discuss the Kashmir case. 25X1

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The Socialists, in order to prevent a Gaullist accession to power, may now try to strengthen the wobbly Pleven government by supporting such a national economic conference.

French Communists have consistently failed in their strike movements largely because they were ordered to tie in political objectives.

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